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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondents Joseph B. Allman and seven other claimants
were each respectively employed by certain of the appellants
above. They are trade unionists affiliated with one of the
Six Basic Crafts (A. F. of L.), employed in Utah's heavy construction industry.
Respondents were each awarded unemployment compensation by virtue of 42-2a, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, for
the week ending June 10, 1950. While the responsibility to
sustain these awards falls upon the Unemployment Compensation Division of the State Industrial Commission, the significance and novelty of the proposition now before the court impels this Brief to present the position of the respondents as
members of organized labor.
The question before the Court has lately obtained the
attention of several State Supreme and Appellate Courts due
mainly to labor disputes involving employment in the highly
integrated automotive industry.
To the recital of facts supplied by counsel for the appellants and the Industrial Commission, these respondents detail
the following statement of facts in their view of the evidence
in the record:

FACTS
In excess of 5,000 Utah workmen were laid off as a result
of the Associated General Contractors (hereinafter called A.
G. C.) shutdown and lockout of their plants commencing June
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2, 1950, after the incidence of the Paul (Ogden) and Barker

(Salt Lake City) job strikes. (See Stipulation of facts, Paragraph 10, Department's Exhibit 1, (T-7).
After the notification of February 27, 1950, reopening the
contract for wage negotiations, the Six Basic Crafts, through
its authorized agent, R. S. Roberts, advised thirty to forty of
the A. G. C. members individually the Unions' intention to
bargain with the contractors (T-80). This statement of facts
is at variance with appellants' recital of the same fact. (See
their Brief, paragraph 2, page 8.)
The unions, according to Mr. Roberts, considered themselves open at all times to bargain individually with the contractors after the notification of February 27, 1950 (T. 81).
Neither the Six Basic Crafts, nor its membership, acquiesced in the proposition that the contractors considered a
"strike against one, a strike against all" ( T-79) .
The contractors association, through its general counsel,
published in Salt Lake City newspapers their lockout strategy,
(appellants' exhibit No. 8 (T-19) and by implication threatened their workers with a reprisal lockout if a strike occurred
at a single A. G. C. construction.
Previously in 1948, (T-78) under a similar A. G. C.-union
agreement, when the Six Basic Crafts took action against less
than all of the members to the contract, other A. G. C. members did not treat such action a "strike against all" and retaliate by shutting down their plants ( T-79) . This policy was
true also in 1947 with the cement finishers union, one of the

5
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Six Basic Crafts (T-91, 92). The iron workers union, one of
the Six Basic Crafts, notwithstanding their inclusion in the
present so-called master agreement, continued to bargain annually individually with A. G. C. (T-83) and in such cases
A. G. C. did not take mass action, shut-down, against the iron
workers or others of the Si~C Basic Crafts on such individual
demands (T-83).
Only on the Paul and Barker jobs were picket lines established. No other A. G. C. plants were picketed. Only two
pickets, employees of Barker and not a claimant herein, were
engaged in picketing (T-82).
The strike vote at the Paul and Barker jobs was supervised by th~ Industrial Commission of Utah and no strike vote
was taken against any other A. G. C. job (T-86 and 87).
The collective bargaining agreement in effect, provides:
"Article IX.
A. The term of this Agreement shall commence on
the date first before set forth and shall continue
until the first day of June, 1951, and for additional
· periods of one year thereafter; provided, however,

either party to the Agreement may by the following
conditions open this Agreement June 1st, 1950 for
wages only. Should either party desire to modify
any portion or any of the terms hereof, it shall notify the other party in writing of such desire, specifying therein the terms or provisions which it desires
to modify, the modifications requested and the new
sections, if any, it desires included. Such notice
shall be given on or before the first day of March,
1951, or on or before the first day of March prior
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to the end of any subsequent yearly extension
hereof. If such notice be not given within such
period of time, then this agreement shall automatically renew itself for an additional period of one
year as herein provided. Should the wage reopening clause be exercised by either pa,-ty for the year
of 1950, it shall automatically render inoperative
Article IV, Section F, if no agreement is reached by
June 1, 1950."
Article IV of the agreement provides:
"F. It is the purpose and intent of the parties hereto
that all grievances and disputes arising under this
Agreement be settled in accordance with the procedure hereinabove set forth and that during the
term of this Agreement, the Unions signatory
hereto or in whose behalf this Agreement is made,
shall not during the term hereof call or engage
in, sanction or assist in, a strike against or slow
down or stoppage of work of the Contractor, and
that there shall be no stoppage of work by any
party hereto for any reason. Unions will require
its members to perform their services for the Contractors on all work described herein when requested by contractors to do so; and Contractors
will not cause or permit any lockout of members
of signatory Unions during the term of this Agree·
ment."
The collective bargaining agreement became effective as
to the contractors only if the individual members of the association became signators to the agreement and any modification as to wages required the signature and agreement of the
individual members. (See Stipulation of facts, Paragraph 6,
Defendants' Exhibit 1, (T-7).
7
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THE ISSUE
Did the Industrial Commission act in accordance with
law in granting respondents unemployment compensation
award for the week of June 10, 1950?

ARGUMENT
Answer to appellants' Point 1.

.,

The fact that the Six Basic Crafts recognized A. G. C. as
an appropriate bargaining unit for its membership did not
prevent the unions from taking legal concerted action against
sin~le members after the association-wide negotiations reached ~1.·
an tmpasse.
~
Answer to appellants' Point 2.

-~

The respondents were not engaged in a "strike" such as
to disqualify them from benefits within the meaning of the act.
Point 3.
Assuming for argument's sake that respondents were engaged in disqualifying activities, the Utah Unemployment Compensation Act eliminates such disqualification where the unemployment is caused by an employer-created strike or lockout.
All three propositions above are inter-related and will
be argued as one.
Appellants' Point 1 that all parties were legally bound to
8
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recognize the bargaining unit until the expiration of the agreement in June, 1951, is not persuasive. These respondents do
not contend that the Paul and Barker strikes dissolved the bargaining unit and because of such fact barred recognition of
the A. G. C. unit. The respondents contend that after the
impasse of June 1st on the wage question, the A. G. C. unit
had broken down. Nothing in the contract precluded the employers from withdrawing from the unit, hence the unions
were permitted to bargain with the individual employers sep- ·
arately. From the facts recited earlier in this Brief (Pages
5, 6, and 7) there was ample precedent for individual employer bargaining. Each of thirty to forty individual contractors received notification of the reopening for wage talks
February 27, 1950, and in the past, (See pages 5, 6, and 7,
this Brief) whenever mass bargaining had broken down and
individual bargaining occurred never did A. G. C. treat such
incidents with lockout reprisal. Furthermore, b~fore any
member of the association was bound to the contract or any
modification to it he would have to sign the agreement individually. The Labor Committee of A. G. C. required either
power of attorney or individual signature of its members.
The point we make is this: Granted that A. G. C. was
an appropriate bargaining unit for association-wide negotiations, it was not the only appropriate unit.
After the impasse separate negotiations were not only
permitted, but in the logic of the times, desirable. The authority of A. G. C. must be limited to association-wide negotiations.
If separate negotiations are not permitted, the impasse would
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almost always either widen and prolong industrial strife or
necessarily deprive the unions of their right to take legal con-certed action against all but the entire industry.
It is conceded that rulings of the National Labor Relations Board, a federal quasi-judicial administrative agency, do
not constitute judicial authority. They are, however, entitled
to be given some weight because that Board is charged with
. the administration of a national labor relations act and has
'
undoubtedly, developed some familiarity with the legislative
history of both national and state labor policy.

The recent decision of the National Labor Relations
Board in the case of Morand Brothers Beverage Co., September
25, 1950, 91 NLRB 58, applies the correct rationale to the
issue now before the court.
In that case, the employer was charged with an unfair
labor practice under the National Labor Relations Board Act
interfering with union activity. The facts were, since 1943 a
local union had bargained with the employers' association on
behalf of· the salesmen. In March 1949, after unsuccessful
negotiations for a new contract, the local sent directly to each
employer for signature the same contract that had been proposed to the joint committee which represented all the employers. No employer accepted the contract, and joint negotiations were resumed. .After another impasse was reached,
the union called a strike limited to one employer. On the following day, the other employers in the association sent their
salesmen a letter stating that it was the union's intent eventually to call a strike against every employer in the association.
10
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The letter then requested the salesmen to turn over their
records and settle their accounts. This was construed as a
discharge.
The Board found.that the employees had been discharged,
not just laid off pending settlement of the contract. It expressly refused to decide whether a layoff would have been
proper. It held that the discharge of the striking employees
was illegal, as an attempt to penalize them for striking and
thus discourage future concerted activity. Discharge of nonstriking employees was also held to be discriminatory, in that
it was a reprisal either against a possible future strike or
against a strike by other members of the same union against
one employer.
The argument that the discharges were defensive measure to protect the association members from strikes by the
union against the employers, one by one, was rejected. The
Board held that an employer's economic interest in preventing
a successful strike did not justify conduct proscribed by the act.
It pointed out that a contrary view, if applied, would permit
the widening of industrial strife, while the purpose of the act
was to prevent it. If the policy ·defended by the association
were permitted, a one-employer strike could be converted into
an industry-wide dispute; and since discharge of strikers for
strike activity is illegal, a union, in its turn, would be encouraged to strike all or none of the employers.
Member Reynolds dissented from this conclusion. He
stated that the employers' action constituted a lockout or layoff rather than a discharge, as shown by their failure to resume
11
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operations or replace the employees; and that there was no
background of anti-union activity on the part of the employers.
The Board also ruled that the union's strike against one
employer and its attempt to enter into• separate negotiations
with that employer did not constitute restraint or coercion in
the selection of bargaining representatives under Section s
(b) ( 1) and (B) , of the National Labor Relations Act. There
was insufficient evidence, the Board held, that this employer

had designated the joint committee as its bargaining agent for
separate negotiations, as well as for association-wide negotiations. Neither was there evidence, it held, that the union
would have rejected the joint committee as the employer's
representative in separate negotiations. The strike was not
an attempt to coerce the employer to resign from the association, the Board held; nor were the union's proposals to the
various employers for separate negotiations a refusal to bargain.
It was pointed out that, since an employer could withdraw
from a multi-employer unit, a union should also be permitted
to bargain with individual employers separately after negotiations with the larger unit had broken down. Furthermore, the
Board held, even if the association were the only appropriate
unit, the union was not required to bargain with all employers
simultaneously or to negotiate the same contract with all.

While admitting that in the first instance, the union was
obliged to bargain with the association rather than with sepa·
rate employer members, the Board stated that, after an impasse
had been reached, separate negotiations were permissible. Such
separate negotiations, it pointed out, were not shown to pre-
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elude simultaneous association-wide negotiations. At any rate,
it held the authority of the association was apparently limited
to association-wide negotiations. The association, while an
appropriate bargaining unit, was held to be not the only
appropriate unit.
Counsel for these respondents is aware that a contrary
opinion was rendered in June, 1950, by Robert N. Denham,
general counsel for the National Labor Relations Board. (See
26 LRR 153). Mr. Denham refused to issue a complaint
against employers who had ellegedly locked out their employees. The teamsters union struck only three dairies in
a nine-member association in Washington, D.C., with which
it had contracted in the past. When the other six dairies in
the association closed down their operations, the union filed
charges of discriminatory lockout with the general counsel and
requested the general counsel to issue an unfair labor practice
complaint. Air. Denham's reasons for rejecting the union's
charge were "the employees of the nine dairies constitute a
single unit for the purpose of collective bargaining and that
a strike against any one or more of the dairies who collectively
make up the employer group, becomes a strike against the
entire organization and justifies all of the members of the
employer group in exercising their full economic force to <;ounteract the economic force of the union represented by its
strike call."
The Morand case was decided after Denham's above
opinion and since June, 1950 Mr. Denham has been replaced
by a new general counsel.
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Attention is now called to Articles IX and IV F. of the
Labor agreement pursuant to which it was legal for the union
to take concerted action after an impasse had occurred on the
wage talks; it is submitted that the fact that a labor agreement
was in effect did not preclude the unions from taking legal and
concerted action against single members.
Answer to Appellants' Point 2.
It is submitted that counsel for the Industrial Commission
has properly briefed the law on the direct issue of respondents'
entitlement for their awards. These respondents join in the
Industrial Commission Brief and cases and arguments cited
therein.

Respondents contend that they were not unemployed due
to a stoppage of work which existed because of a "strike"
involving their grade, class or group of workers at the factory
or establishment at which they were last employed.
To rule otherwise would ignore the fact that the A. G. C.
association constituted between forty to seventy individual
and separate employer units, with separate business structures
and payrolls, engaged in every kind of industrial construction
throughout the State of Utah. Merely because these contractors
bargained as a unit through an industrial association (A. G. C.)
does not relate their businesses or make their establishments
synonymous within the meaning of the act so as to disqualify
these respondents. The contrary must have been intended by
our legislature. The public policy declared to apply to our un·
employment act is:

14
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"To prevent its (unemployment) spread and to
lighten its burden which now so often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his family.''
If appellants' contention is accepted, real violence is done to
this policy by the mere act of employers pyramiding into industrial associations, becoming related to other employers
through a chain of verbal connection, so that ultimately wherever a trade dispute exists with any employer who is associated
with other employers in such a pyramided structure, they
could thus impair the full purpose of the act.

The weakness of appellants' position is apparent from
the fact that no contractor became bound to the agreement
merely by his membership in A. G. C. The contractors' signature was required to the labor agreement. The Labor Committee of A. G. C. could not take economic action nor bind
any member to a modification of the agreement on behalf of
any single member who failed to acquiesce in its strategy or its
negotiations. A. G. C. is a mere association and not an employing or multi-employing unit within the meaning of this
act. It is conceivable that a single construction company might
own and operate ten to fifteen integrated yet separate establishments in their business structure throughout this State or several
sates and a rrstrike" at one might disqualify workers of the same
class at other establishments of that company. But merely
because that construction company is a member of a trade association with "X" company, who supplies it with products
should not disqualify its employees if a strike were to occur
at "X" company and eventually cause it to shut down because
of short supplies. To make such separate companies and their
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

establishments synonymous merely because they belong to a
similar trade association would defeat the purpose of our
unemployment compensation act.
The following cases, some of which have been cited in
the Industrial Commission's Brief, may be of assistance to the
Court in this problem:
Nordling vs. Ford Motor Co., (1950) Minn., 42 NW
2d 576
Ford Motor Co. vs. Virginia Compensation Commission ( 1951), Virginia, 63 SE 2nd 28
Bucko vs. Quest Foundry Co., Minnesota, 38 NW
2nd 222
Rhea Mfg. Co. vs. Industrial Commission, Wisconsin, 285 NW 749
Thomas vs. California Employment Stab. Commission, ( 1950) California, (District Court of Appeals),
224 Pac. 2nd 411
Almada vs. Commission ( 1951) Connecticut, 77 A
2d 765
Assif vs. Commission, Connecticut ( 1951) 77 A 2d
772
Machcinski vs. Ford Motor Co., (1951) N.Y. 102
NYS 2d 208
Burger vs. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review
(1951) Pa. Super. 77 A 2d 737
Point 3.
Assuming for argument's sake that respondents were
engaged in disqualifying activities, the Utah Unemployment
Compensation Act eliminates such disqualification where the
employment is caused by an employer-created strike or lockout.
16
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Section 42-2a-S provides:
(2) "If the Commission, upon investigation, shall find
that the employer, his agent, or representative,
has conspired, planned or agreed with any of
his workers, their agents, or representative to
foment a strike, such strike shall not render the
workers ineligible for benefits."
It seems to these respondents the above sub-section can
have one meaning, namely: That our legislature intended to
eliminate the ineligibility disqualification based upon a work
stoppage where the unemployment is proximately caused and
due to an employer-created strike or lockout.

In this case the ultimate and final act causing the unemployment of the respondents and 5,000 other workers was the
mass employer shut-down rather than any preliminary act
which might have furnished a motive for the shut-down causing the unemployment.

A lockout has been defined as:
"To withhold employment from (a body of employees) as a means of bringing them to accept the
employer terms." (See Webster's New International
Dictionary, Second Edition, 1934).
Our Supreme Court has not yet ruled on this proposition.
The statutes of a few states specifically recognize unemployment due to a lockout as an exception to the disqualifications:
Page's Ohio Gen. Code Ann. 1948 Supp. Section
1345-6 (d)
Kentucky Rev. St. 1948, Section 341.360 ( 1)
17
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Arkansas St. 1947 Ann. Section 81-1106 (d) (2)
West Virginia 1947 Supp. to Code of 1943 Section
2366 (78) (4)
Connecticut-Ge~. ~t. _Re~. of 1949, Section 7508 (3)

Gen. Laws of MlSSlSSlppl, 1944, C 288, Section 1
M. S. A. (Minn.) Section 268.09 Sub 1 (a) (b) ( 1)
U.S. 42 USCA, Section 1103 (a) (5)
The case of McKinley vs. California Stab. Employment
Commission, 209 Pacific 2nd 602, cited by appellant is based
upon a California statute that contains no provision whereby
the lockout acts to eliminate the disqualifications; the Minnesota case, Bucko vs. Quest Foundry Co., supra, is based upon
a statute containing an express provision eliminating the disqualification where unemployment is due to a lockout. See
Almada vs. Commission ( 1951) Conn. 77 A 2d 765; Assif
vs. Commission, ( 1951) Conn., 77 A 2d 772, and Burger vs.
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review (Pa. Super.) 77 A 2d,
737.
Once it is established that the unemployment is caused
by the direct and proximate act of his employer's lockout, the
exception to such disqualification should apply regardless of
whether the employees are members of the same trade union
which is engaged with other employers, members of the same
trade association, in a labor dispute. The fact that these respondents might receive an increase in wages as a result of
the action taken against other employers, or that the appellants
believe their employer anti-strike strategy warranted the lockout, should have nothing to do with the eligibility of these
respondents for their unemployment compensation benefits .
•
These respondents have a vested interest in their entitlement
18
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inasmuch as a portion of their weekly wage goes to pay the
premium for which they receive this insurance.
The Utah statute admittedly is not as specific on this
point as the Minnesota law, but certainly indicates the intention
of our legislature not to bar a claimant when unemployment is
due to a lockout in no way the fault of the employee.

CONCLUSION
The facts here are clear that immediately following the
legal strike of June 1, 1950, at the Paul and Barker jobs, the
majority of the A. G. C. contractors, by a pre-arranged plan
of strategy agreed to on 11ay 17, 1950, shut down and locked
out in excess of 5,000 employees, of which these claimants
were a class. The record is clear that these 5,000 claimants
were willing to continue working at existing rates and there
was work available. It cannot be said that their unemployment was due to a stoppage of work which exists because
of a strike at the establishment at which they were last employed.
This employee lockout was used as a weapon by the employers as a counterpart of the strike at the two jobs; the employer appellants certainly weighed all its aspects before using
this tactic.

If the lockout of these 5,000 workmen had continued, the
economic and social well-being of the State could have been
severely injured. The appellants created a mass unemployment
situation and should not now be heard to complain, having
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created it, that their unemployed workers were not entitled
to minimum unemployment benefits.
The respondents, as members of organized labor, do not
ask for preferred treatment. They merely ask for their entitlement under law. For the reasons cited herein and by the Industrial Commission, we contend that the decision of the
Industrial Commission was proper and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

A. W. SANDACK,
Attorney for Respondents
Joseph B. Allman, et al.
1122 Continental Bank Bldg.,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
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